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Abstract and Keywords
This essay first surveys Hölderlin’s mature philosophical sense of the human 
subject as caught ineluctably between abstract reflection and concrete 
receptivity, and it contrasts that sense briefly with the stances of Kant, Schiller, 
and Hegel. It then traces the consequences of this sense for Hölderlin’s 
poetology, and it concludes by showing how both this philosophical sense and 
this poetology are enacted in Hölderlin’s late, major fragment “Rousseau.”
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7.1.
As the name of the discipline implies, philosophy is centrally concerned not 
simply with knowledge alone, but with wisdom or with the problem of 
orientation or with the achievement of a life of felt and reasonable 
meaningfulness. In strongly traditional societies, this problem may not arise, or 
solutions to it may be held in place as what is simply to be done, without diverse 
paths or possibilities of reflection on them significantly presenting themselves. 
Within modern social economies, marked in contrast by technological 
development and strongly divided labor, things are much less settled, in ways 
that can provoke both anxiety and reflection. But how is reflection then to 
develop fruitfully? If it is significantly abstract overall, then it threatens both to 
lose touch with concrete life practices and in doing so to turn either emptily 
escapist or dogmatically tyrannical. Yet if it lingers entirely in the concrete, then 
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it threatens to fail to resolve anxieties and to challenge social and practical 
fractures that are already in place. In the face of this dilemma, reflection seems 
both impossible and necessary.
Writing roughly between 1795 and 1815 in the wake of emerging secularization 
and showing a strong consciousness of social life as both fractured  (p.130) and 
unavoidable, a number of writers whom we now class as Romantic—pre- 
eminently Hölderlin and Wordsworth, Goethe in his lyric poetry, and Blake and 
Coleridge—developed a kind of practice of philosophy by other means. Swerving 
between abstract reflection and concrete description and between rationalism 
and empiricism, they developed strong senses of human subjects as bound to a 
temporality that is not discernibly plotted and yet with which one can (so they 
suggested) at times come to terms. They accept neither human fatedness to life 
within unintelligible and impersonal processes alone nor fantasies of either 
escape or full control of the conditions of life, so that “romanticism” becomes a 
name for philosophy done, the problem of orientation addressed, otherwise than 
only in abstract distantiation from the ordinary. Its images of coming to maturity, 
even if imperfectly and without dogmatism and final closure, stand as models 
that are distinctly relevant to our thinking about maturity and orientation in life, 
given a modern social economy that we significantly share with them.1 Attention 
to their strongly temporalized thought and writing can help alert us both to how 
philosophy and poetry may be entangled with one another in relation to certain 
central problems of modern human life and to possibilities of maturity that we 
might otherwise fail to notice or articulate.
7.2.
It is well known that Hölderlin’s mature poetry is significantly motivated by his 
sense, developing out of his criticism of Fichte, of the self-occlusion of the 
Absolute. As in German idealism generally, “the Absolute” names that which is 
not dependent on anything else and simply is––a self-determining whole that 
includes all of nature and human life. Contra Fichte, Hölderlin argues, “If I say: 
‘I am I, [then] the subject (“I”) and the object (“I) are not united in such a way 
that no separation could be performed without violating the essence of what is 
to be separated; on the contrary, the I is only possible by means of this 
separation of the I from the I.”2 Ignoring the mistaken treatment of the is of 
identity as the is of predication, the argument is straightforward and compelling. 
Being a subject—that which we primarily refer to by means of “I”—implies 
apperceptive unity; that is, it implies at least the possibility of coming to be 
explicitly aware of the contents of one’s consciousness as the contents of one’s 
consciousness. Any thing that lacked this capacity could not properly be called a 
subject. But this capacity in turns implies the ability, as it were, to separate 
oneself from oneself, in particular to focus on the contents of one’s 
consciousness as not essential to what one is. I am thinking of a dog, say, but I 
could be thinking instead (and sometimes do think instead) of a cup of coffee. 
Hence neither of these contents is itself essential to my identity as a subject. But 
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for the Absolute, in contrast, everything is essential. That is, it is not subject-like. 
And hence, further, we, as  (p.131) finite subjects are separated, cast out, from 
this original, all-embracing unity of Being as such. Insofar as we do possess a 
consciousness that is both apperceptively unified and discursive (such that we 
are able to form judgments), we are “outside” a more original, inclusive unity, 
able to attend to this or that, but never simply bound within the flow of the 
whole. Our status as subjects is marked, as Hölderlin puts it, by an “arche- 
separation,” an Ur-theilung.3 Both reflection and we as subjects capable of 
reflection are somehow within the Absolute, but also separated from its 
continuous self-development, not essential to it.
It is not immediately clear how much of this argument is sound or what its 
implications are. It might well be conceded that the Absolute—supposing to 
begin with that we find much use for a concept of the whole of Being—is not 
itself subject-like or reflective or apperceptively unified in the way that we are as 
finite subjects. But why should that thought imply the further thought that we, 
as finite subjects, are somehow exterior to it, separated or cast out from it?
Here Hölderlin is best taken as registering an experienced sense of exteriority, of 
absence of orientation, and of the capacity for reflection as a set of undischarged 
burdens that have roots that are all at once religious, biographical, 
sociohistorical, and anthropologico-developmental. In religious terms, an 
understanding of the Absolute as non-subject-like and self-enclosed already 
registers a sense of the collapse or unavailability of any narrative of God’s 
providence. In his 1785 Briefe über die Lehre Spinozas that initiated the 
Pantheism Controversy, Jacobi had already associated Spinozism with 
materialism and atheism, and this association was well known to Hölderlin and 
his Tübingen circle during his student years. A Spinozist Absolute is, therefore, 
marked as a nonprovidential, non-Christian Absolute for Hölderlin.
Biographically, Hölderlin experienced a continuing series of failures to settle into 
a permanent position. From 1793, when he left Tübingen, to 1802, he held a 
series of tutorships in private families at Waltershausen, Frankfurt, Hauptwil 
(Switzerland), and Bordeaux (France), retaining only one of them for more than 
four months. The exception—January 1796 to September 1798 in the household 
of the Gontards in Frankfurt—was marked by an intense and disastrous love 
affair with Suzette Gontard, the much younger wife of his banker employer. 
Following his dismissal from this post, Hölderlin managed a number of 
clandestine meetings with Suzette up until her death in June 1802. After 1802, 
following his return from Bordeaux in a precarious mental condition, Hölderlin 
lived primarily in Homburg with an official salary as court librarian, but no real 
duties, until his removal to a Tübingen asylum in 1806 and final years in the care 
of Ernst Zimmer from 1807 to 1843. This unstable itinerary shows a marked lack 
of any unifying narrative or sense of continuing orientation. Improvised 
arrangements are made hurriedly, and they do not last long. Sociohistorically, 
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Hölderlin’s career is marked by his refusal to take up the post  (p.132) of a 
village pastor for which he had been trained at Tübingen. Not much else was 
open to him other than a position as a private tutor. Hölderlin was neither noble 
nor rich enough to enter court life, nor was either the university or the market 
economy yet fully open to an ambitious young man with primarily theological 
training. Hence Hölderlin’s drift, though exacerbated by his mental instability, is 
not untypical of the rootlessness of a young male member of an emerging 
humanistically educated class who lacked definite social prospects. Finally, 
anthropologico-developmentally, it is, after all, a mystery how anyone comes to 
be a subject with discursively structured consciousness. This development into a 
life of explicit claim-making, norm-mongering, and reflectiveness does not 
happen with other animals. How, then, do we move from the dependent infants 
we initially are into being the active makers of judgments we come to be? Surely 
training, initiation into language, and the attentions of others play important 
roles in this development, but how, and to what purpose? A sense of rootlessness 
or undirectedness might well arise for anyone in light of this course of 
development, and on Hölderlin’s part this sense can only have been exacerbated 
by his religious, biographical, and modern sociohistorical experiences.
Independent of argument, then, about exclusion from a Spinozist Absolute, 
Hölderlin’s sense of exteriority to Being as such is, to put it mildly, 
overdetermined. Whether or not there is a proof of the exteriority of reflective 
consciousness to being, Hölderlin nonetheless powerfully thematizes an 
experience of exteriority and difficulty of orientation. Or, as he puts it, there is “a 
universal contradiction within man... between the striving for the absolute and 
the striving for restriction.”4 We seek, that is, to achieve mastery or appropriate 
orientation by means of philosophical knowledge of the whole of Being and our 
place in it, and we also find ourselves driven to throw off the burden of reflective 
consciousness and to accept limitation and naturalness. As Terry Pinkard 
usefully explicates the point, the founding thought of both German idealism and 
German romanticism, initiated by Hölderlin, is that “it is the way in which we 
hold such oppositions together that characterizes our agency.... We always begin 
with a ‘certainty’ about where we are––with a practical, pre-reflective implicit 
grasp of what counts as vouching for our judgments, our practices, our 
valuations... and we then come to ask whether that ‘certainty’ has any ‘truth’ in 
light of the kinds of skepticism that open up as that form of ‘certainty’ subjects 
itself to its own internal tests.”5 Hegel’s wager is that this prereflective 
“certainty” is already implicitly conceptual and that that conceptual commitment 
can be made explicit, tested, and revised until we arrive at stable enough 
orientation. Hölderlin’s particular honesty and courage—his openness to 
continuing skepticism—is instead to hold that both striving for a reflective 
understanding of appropriate orientation and openness to sudden, abrupt, 
uncontrolled limitation (whether via reversal or via the absorptive sweep of love, 
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beauty, and  (p.133) passion) persist always in tension with one another, with no 
standing resolution and only moments of relative balance.6
The result in Hölderlin’s writing, both theoretical and poetic, that enacts this 
tension is a kind of back-and-forth movement between distantiated, abstract 
theorizing and immersive, absorptive dwelling in perception and feeling as 
given. In the mode of abstract theorizing, he seeks the “true profundity” of 
“complete knowledge of the parts that we must found and combine into one, and 
deep knowledge of that which founds and comprehends, piercing to the farthest 
end of knowledge.”7 Without fundamental knowledge of one’s place in the whole, 
there is neither dignity nor actively maintained orientation. In more optimistic 
Fichtean moments, Hölderlin suggests that “he who truly acts according to the 
whole is by himself thereby more consecrated to peace and more disposed to 
esteem the individual.”8 This implies that action according to the whole is 
possible and hence that the wages of reflection on the whole that issues in 
appropriate action need not be only distantiation and alienation. Likewise, in a 
1797 letter to Schiller, Hölderlin argues that abstract reflection, shying from life 
into thought, while difficult, is also both natural and fruitful.
I now regard the metaphysical mood as a kind of virginity of spirit, and I 
believe that shyness in the face of the material, however unnatural it is in 
itself, is nonetheless very natural at a certain period of life, and that it is 
for a time beneficial, just as all flights out of determinate relations are, 
since they check the power in oneself and make the spendthrift youthful 
life thrifty, for just so long, until its now ripe exuberance drives it to divide 
and distribute itself [sich zu theilen] in relation to manifold objects... I 
believe also... that the Idea is prior to the Concept, just as the tendency is 
prior to the (determinate, regular) act. I regard Reason [die Vernunft] as 
the beginning of the understanding [der Verstand], and if the good will 
hesitates and has to exert itself in order to form a useful intention, so do I 
find this just as characteristic for human nature in general as it is 
characteristic for Hamlet, for whom it is so difficult to do something for the 
sake of the single end of avenging his father.9
Here, however, the optimism, while present, is substantially more moderated. 
Instead of giving up philosophy as fruitless, as Schiller had urged him to do, 
Hölderlin defends metaphysics and abstract reflection as appropriate for a 
certain period of time at a certain stage of life. It as it were helps us to gather 
and collect our powers, thence to use them appropriately, rather than wasting 
them in heapish series of unreflective, ill-considered actions. But as the 
concluding reference to Hamlet suggests, it may nonetheless be far from 
straightforward to translate the fruits of reason into specific action.
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 (p.134) In recoil, then, from a life of abstract reflection that produces as much 
continuing anxiety as direction, Hölderlin also celebrates the fact that the “airy 
spirits [Luftgeister] with metaphysical wings”10 have left him, thus enabling 
greater peace in freedom from reflection. Persistent thinking about orientation, 
without fixed and stable results, yields only restlessness; without receptivity, 
there is no composure. Something must come from without, in order to inform 
and give content to thinking. Thought alone is unable to generate determinate 
objects. “When I think an object as possible, then I only repeat the previously 
existent consciousness by means of which it is actual. There is for us no 
thinkable possibility that was not at one time actuality.”11 As Violetta Waibel 
usefully comments, “Hölderlin seems not simply to negate principles and a priori 
moments of thinking, but rather to regard them as forms of abstraction that are 
not thinkable independently and without being bound to concrete states of 
affairs.”12 Broadly speaking, as Waibel also notes, a suspicion of abstract 
thinking on Hölderlin’s part is a continuing point of contact between his 
poetological writings and the skepticism of Jacobi. Both Jacobi and Hölderlin, as 
Waibel puts it, give primacy to “existential orientation in the world 
[Befindlichkeit in der Welt]” and so “assign to anthropology...a precedence over 
a philosophical mode of explanation that threatens to become an intellectual end 
in itself.”13 This suspicion of abstract thinking is further reinforced by 
Hölderlin’s reading of Plato, especially of the Symposium, where love (eros) is 
presented as a force of attraction to concrete things that is co-primordial with 
the emergence of consciousness itself. Or in Hölderlin’s own formulation:
As our original infinite essence became suffering for the first time and as 
our free, full power felt its first limits, as poverty mated with exuberance, 
then there was love. Ask yourself: when was that? Plato says: on the day 
that Aphrodite was born. Thus just then, when the beautiful world began 
for us, when we came to consciousness, then we became finite.14
This condensed parable of the emergence of finite consciousness shows it as 
always already marked by concrete attraction to finite, beautiful, given objects 
of attention. Hölderlin’s sense that human consciousness is always so marked 
leads him, as Thomas Pfau puts it, to develop a “neo-Platonist project of 
overcoming the sensible/intelligible dualism without relegating the concrete, 
individual intuition to a mere ancillary function.”15 Moreover, as Pfau goes on, 
“Hölderlin does not simply stabilize this convergence of intuition and the 
intelligible in an ontological sense either; for its occurrence, linked to the 
creative imagination, is ‘accidental,’ that is, cannot be freely grounded as a 
necessity.”16 That is to say, while developmentally discursive consciousness 
begins as always already bound up with experiences of intense felt attractions to 
natural, more or  (p.135) less maternal, presences, the recurrence of such 
intensities of attraction at later stages is hostage to fortune. Within the orbit of 
this Neoplatonic anthropology that sees thought as bound up with eros, 
Hölderlin in contrast to idealism shifts, as Pfau puts it, “from a notion of 
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intuition as Anschauung to intuition as analeptic Ahndung.”17 (“Ahndung” is 
Hölderlin’s archaic Swabian spelling of Ahnung—presentiment, foreshadowing, 
or intuitiveness. “Analeptic” indicates that such a presentiment is animating or 
restorative.) That is to say, orientation in life is achieved, if it is achieved at all, 
only through an unpredictable, restorative moment of receptivity that furnishes 
content to a desire that aims to reachieve the intensities of attraction 
characteristic of early childhood. That such experiences of animated receptivity 
are essentially occasioned and accidental thus calls into question the very 
possibility of getting a grip on one’s life according to abstract principles 
generated in reflection. In Pfau’s formulation, “it poses a serious challenge to 
the possibility of an integral subjectivity, that is, to the continuity of a ‘self’ as 
such.”18
And yet Hölderlin does not quite abandon reason and reflection altogether. He 
continues to see the pursuit of autonomy and self-command, grounded in 
rational reflection and expressed in adherence to principles, as also part of 
man’s higher than merely animal nature. Unlike other animals, we are, as both 
burdened and gifted with reflection, anticipation, and memory, open to “infinite 
satisfaction, ...provided that [man’s] activity is of the right kind, is not too far- 
reaching for him, for his strength and skill, that he is not too restless, too 
undetermined nor, on the other hand, too anxious, too restricted, too 
controlled.”19 As the unresolved two directions of mutual qualification in this 
passage show—we must be determined, resolute, in charge of what we do, but 
not too much; and we must be receptive, open, and ready to accept what 
happens but not too much20 ––Hölderlin develops a philosophical anthropology 
that combines elements from Kant, empiricism, and what would become 
Hegelianism, but that also differs strikingly from each of them. As in Kant, the 
exercise of reason and reflection to generate a moral law matters as a 
fundamental aspect of our dignity, but in contrast with Kant this exercise cannot 
take place on its own, apart from intense experiences of attraction. As in 
empiricism, receptive sense-experience is an essential source of content for 
orientation in life, but in contrast with empiricism sense-experience is not simply 
dispositive, and it is available not continuously, but only intermittently, in 
moments of intense attraction to a concrete object, person, or scene. As in 
Hegel, there is prereflective orientation to the world that can be to some extent 
articulated, but in contrast with Hegel the relevant articulation that yields 
orientation is itself temporary, strongly temporalized, and bound up more with 
erotic attractions, embodiment, and openness to natural beauty than with 
participation in public life.
 (p.136) Given, then, Hölderlin’s continuing intense and intensely ambivalent, 
competing attractions to both active, reflective, abstract theorizing and 
immersive, absorptive dwelling in perceptions and relationships, it is no surprise 
that he is unable to follow Schiller’s (all too autobiographical) advice to him that 
he should “flee philosophical material wherever possible; it is the most thankless 
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of all, and the best powers are often consumed in fruitless wrestling with it. 
Remain closer to the world of the senses so that you will be less in danger either 
of losing sobriety [Nüchternhheit] in rapture [Begeisterung] or of straying into a 
contrived [gekünstelt] expression.”21 For Schiller, philosophy and abstract 
reflection could and should be left behind, as Schiller indeed abandoned them 
and returned to drama after the period of his intense absorption in Kantianism 
from 1793 to 1795. In contrast, instead of turning away from philosophy and to 
poetry as a separate and distinct practice, Hölderlin takes up the task of 
incorporating alternations between moments of abstract reflection and moments 
of intense absorption into a self-developing poetic whole. As he comments in a 
1799 letter to his brother,
Poetry unites men not, I say, in the manner of play; it unites them, namely, 
when it is genuine and functions [wirkt] genuinely––with all the manifold 
suffering, happiness, striving, hoping and fearing, with all the opinions and 
errors, all the virtues and ideas, with everything great and small, that is 
among them—as a living, thousandfold divided [gegliedert] heartfelt [innig] 
whole.22
The consequence in the poetry of the bearing of this task is that poetry remains 
internally related to philosophy, as it is oriented around what Hölderlin calls 
transitions (Wechsel) in mood, where the transitions themselves are marked by 
the same sort of difficulty and abruptness that mark their occurrence in daily 
life. Or as Hölderlin puts it to his brother, “I cannot easily find my way out of 
reasoning [Raisonnement] and into poetry, and vice versa....Perhaps only a few 
people will have as much difficulty with the transition [Übergang] from one 
mood to another as I do.”23
The result is a difficult poetry more continuously of open, even abrupt, transition 
than of completed doctrinal closure. As Waibel usefully puts it, Hölderlin’s 
concept—decisive for his poetry—of reciprocal determination 
(Wechselbestimming) of moods must be understood in the framework of a theory 
of drives. One concept at the same time determines its opposite, so that both 
stand in a relation of reciprocal determination. Something must stand opposed 
to the I that is infinite in itself—either an object or alternatively a world of 
objectivity—in order for it to feel and cognize. In the same way, a striving toward 
the infinite, that is, a striving to realize ideas, is also unthinkable,  (p.137) 
without a simultaneous striving toward limitation, that is, toward an actual 
recognition of the conditioned character of existence.24
Neither drive—neither the drive toward selfhood and fully autonomous activity 
in self-sustaining abstract thinking, nor the drive toward receptivity to and 
absorption in the finite—can properly be denied, abandoned, or avoided. Or as 
Hölderlin puts it in a prose fragment of the metrical version of Hyperion, “we 
cannot deny the drive to free ourselves, to ennoble ourselves, to progress into 
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the infinite. That would be animalistic. But we can also not deny the drive to be 
determined, to be receptive; that would not be human.”25 Since both drives 
remain present and undeniable, with neither being sacrificed to the other and 
with no possibility of their stable integration, the result, as Waibel puts it, of “the 
thought-figure of reciprocal determination” is “a metaphysics of the finite” that 
continuously accepts and embraces “the possibility of reversal.”26
Within the poetry that enacts this sense of the subject always open to the 
possibility of reversal, it is necessary, always, “to bear the momentarily 
incomplete.”27 “Real effectiveness” requires neither too much mingling of self- 
determining, ennobling, reflective activity with sensuousness, receptivity, and 
the ordinary nor too much isolation from them.28 Instead of simply reaching a 
doctrinal conclusion, and instead of maintaining itself either in the sphere of 
pure reflective activity or in the sphere of the registering of the sensuously 
given, the successful poem must instead work through reflective-rational activity 
in relation to experience of a sensuously given object. The proper thematic 
subject matter of poetry in general is thus, one might say, not a given object, but 
rather an object as-it-is-experienced-by-a-subject-prompted-to-feeling-and- 
reflection in relation to it. In close proximity to the Wordsworthian thought that 
it is “the feeling [and associated reflection] therein developed [that] gives 
importance to the [given] action and situation, and not the action and situation 
to the feeling,”29 self-recognition is possible only by attending to and working 
through relations between subject activity and determinate objects. As Waibel 
summarizes the point, for Hölderlin
Self-knowledge can only grasp the determinations of human existence 
when it reaches out beyond a merely formal self-relation. This self- 
knowledge must withdraw itself from the aporias of either taking itself to 
be completely graspable through its own activity—which would produce 
only a completely reflective but thereby dead unity—or preserving an 
original liveliness [of experience], but thereby being unable to grasp 
completely either the determination of humanity or the determination of 
poetic composition [Dichtung]. Self-knowledge arises in a living manner, 
according to Hölderlin, when the subject freely chooses an object through 
which it recognizes itself.30
 (p.138) Self-knowledge is achieved, therefore, through an essentially temporal 
course of development of modulated thoughts and feelings in relation to a given 
object of experience. A narration of the course of its achievement—the only way 
to render its content—will consist essentially of four successive stages or 
registers of experience that are reflected in the poem:
(1) An initiating, felt, unarticulated total impression of an object, scene, 
or incident
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(2) The weakening of this initial receptive impression through reflection 
and the division of the objects presented in the total impression into 
opposed yet interrelated parts
(3) The maintaining of the identity of the subject as a locus of active 
attentiveness in relation to the development of the poetic material in 
moving from 1 to 2
(4) The achievement in writing of complete internal relatedness of 1, 2, 
and 3 in a constructed sequence of modulations from beginning (initial 
total receptiveness––1) to middle (conditioned but active subject 
activity––2 and 3) to end (modulated expressiveness of the good-enough 
stability of the subject thus achieved across varying moments of thought 
and receptivity—4).31
The successful poem that begins in 1, moves through 2 and 3, and completes 
itself constructively in 4 is thus itself an achievement of a good-enough self-unity 
despite the omnipresent fact of reversals of subject activity by sensuous 
givenness and of sensuous givenness by subject activity. Hence the underlying 
thought that is embodied in successful Hölderlinian lyric poetry is that “Es war 
doch so schön”32 ––it was all so beautiful anyway. In its registering, expressing, 
and enacting of the play of opposed drives, the successful lyric poem is an 
acknowledgment of the fundamental circumstances of human life as a life of 
conditioned subject activity open to reversals. It is, hence, not the abandonment 
of philosophy and reflective activity in favor of poetry, but instead their situation 
as conditioned within the context of ongoing human life.
7.3.
Thematically and formally, Hölderlin’s poetic practice that situates philosophical 
reflection within the course of life develops out of a number of earlier 
experimentations in theme and form. His earliest poems, such as his early 
Tübingen hymns, alternate between sentimental expressiveness of a subjective 
mood in the style of Klopstock (as in “The Oaks” and “To the Aether”) and a 
more objectively celebratory mode derived from Schiller (as in “Hymn to the 
Goddess of  (p.139) Harmony” and “Hymn to Immortality”). Significantly, 
however, already these early hymns display a certain awkwardness in stance, as 
though the standpoint for what is either to be worshipped or objectively 
celebrated were not entirely secure.33 During his Frankfurt period from January 
1796 to September 1798, Hölderlin produced a number of Diotima poems, 
inspired by Suzette Gontard, as well as nature poems and shorter, epigrammatic 
odes.34 A sharper sense of the difficulties of maintaining an enthusiastic or a 
celebratory stance and voice, a sense that is evident also in the contemporary 
correspondence and theoretical writings, then seems to develop during the 
composition of Hyperion in the period from 1794 to 1797, perhaps influenced by 
the difficulties of his clandestine relations with Suzette/Diotima. As Hölderlin 
famously writes in the preface to the penultimate version of the novel,
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We all run through an eccentric path [eine exzentrische Bahn], and there is 
no other way possible from childhood to completion [Vollendung].
Blissful unity, Being in the unique sense of the word, is lost for us and we 
had to lose it if we are to strive after it and achieve it.
...We have fallen out with nature, and what was once (as we believe) One is 
now in conflict with itself, and mastery and servitude alternate on both 
sides. It often seems to us as if the world were everything and we nothing, 
but often too as if we were everything and the world nothing.
...But neither our knowledge nor our action can attain in any period of our 
existence to that point at which all conflict ceases, where All is one; the 
determinate line can be united with the indeterminate only through an 
infinite approximation [in unendlicher Annäherung].35
Here the subject position is markedly and unresolvedly unstable. Conflict is 
endemic between the human subject standing out from blissful immersion in the 
whole and the whole within which that subject’s activity should be but cannot be 
harmoniously resolved. As a result, nothing can be simply and unreservedly 
praised or celebrated; no doctrine is available to stabilize and justify the stance 
of the subject who would praise, but who remains caught within alternations 
between excess, merely subjective enthusiasm (“as if we were everything and 
the world nothing”) and quiescent, merely passive absorption (“as if the world 
were everything and we nothing”).
The result of this sense of the subject position as always already bound up in 
conflict is a poetry of loss and finitude that tracks and expresses this plight of 
the subject without resolving it. It narrates arcs of motion through moments of 
absorption in the given that are always liable to be ruptured by reflection and 
moments of reflection, power, and insight that are always liable to be ruptured 
by a returning, attractive but recalcitrant given. Rather than announcing  (p. 
140) a doctrine achieved, whether conciliatory or despairing, it moves in fits 
and starts, halted by this moment of perception, then regaining an energy of 
compositional onwardness in registering it, then faltering again as the energy 
cannot be sustained in any single continuing direction. That is, the major poetry 
enacts an effort together with its foundering. It tracks and locates the place of 
the human subject as a being capable of self-initiated attention, reflection, and 
thought within a whole that it should know, but cannot, and within which it 
should be at peace, but cannot be. It is neither within philosophy nor outside it, 
but is rather marked internally by both philosophy and its foundering, just as we 
live neither continuously within reflectiveness nor altogether outside it, neither 
altogether at home nor altogether as nomads.
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7.4.
Among Hölderlin’s major poems, the substantial but still incomplete 
“Rousseau” (1800) is especially clear thematically in illustrating Hölderlin’s 
mature sense of the problem for the human subject of living simultaneously 
within the necessity of reflection and the impossibility of completing it. It is in 
part a reworking into an alcaic ode of the slightly earlier asclepic ode “To the 
Germans.” (Its opening line is line 1 of strophe 11 of “To the Germans.”) Its 
general project is simultaneously to praise Rousseau’s exemplary achieved 
subjectivity while also describing its limitations, thus avoiding any triumphalist 
doctrinalism. Rousseau, as Hölderlin sees him, bears up, one might say, under 
the burden of a subjectivity given over both to visionary reflection on new 
possibilities of more meaningful human life and to their standing 
incompleteness. Hölderlin had read Rousseau’s The Social Contract in 1791. As 
one of the so-called uncouth Jacobins, Hölderlin planted a Liberty Tree in a 
meadow near the Tübingen seminary on Bastille Day, 1793, an act that provoked 
Duke Karl Eugen to place the group under surveillance. While in Jena in 
September 1795, Hölderlin planned to draft a new educational program modeled 
on Rousseau’s Emile and Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse.36 Noting that Rousseau’s 
name is the first name of a modern writer that appears on a list of writers on 
whom Hölderlin planned to write for his projected journal Iduna, Stanley 
Corngold remarks that Rousseau “represents Hölderlin’s first leap of thought to 
modern writing; he constitutes Hölderlin’s frame for his grasp of literary 
modernity.”37 Commenting on the appearances of Rousseau in “The 
Rhine” (1801), Paul de Man notes that Rousseau is, for Hölderlin, 
paradigmatically the one who exercises the distinctive powers of a human 
subject in using language: “Rousseau, as in the ode that bears his name, appears 
above all as the man of language: he listens (l. 143) he speaks (l. 144), he gives 
language (l. 146), and song (l. 165).”38 Richard Unger describes Rousseau  (p. 
141) as functioning as a precursor figure and uncanny double for Hölderlin 
himself. “Rousseau’s “strangeness” for Hölderlin is...the uncanniness a poet 
must experience in another man who ultimately projects his own destiny. 
Paradoxically, Hölderlin views Rousseau, a writer of prose, as the man who most 
clearly anticipates the poetic fulfillment he himself desires.”39
Both the destiny of the modern human subject as the bearer of language and 
reflectiveness and the sort of qualified poetic fulfillment that is possible for such 
a subject are then projected onto Rousseau in the poem “Rousseau,” and the 
itinerary of the bearing of that destiny and of the achievement of that qualified 
fulfillment is tracked narratively. The poem consists of ten strophes, with the 
first four in strict alcaic metric patterns (lines of 11, 11, 9, and 10 beats with a 
regular pattern of stresses) and the last six in uncompleted approximations to 
the alcaic. The first line of the seventh strophe includes an unfilled in past 
participle prefix (“ge”), marking it as uncompleted. The last line of the tenth and 
final strophe is a nonstandard, more abrupt seven-beat line that lends an air of 
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conclusion to the fragment, despite its ending as a fragment with a comma 
rather than a full stop. First in German and then in Nick Hoff’s English 
translation, it reads as follows:
Rousseau
Wie eng begränzt ist unsere Tageszeit.
Du warst und sahst und stauntest, schon Abend ists.
Nun schlafe, wo unendlich ferne
Ziehen vorüber die Völkerjahre.
Und mancher sieht über die eigene Zeit
Ihm zeigt ein Gott ins Freie, doch sehnend stehst
Am Ufer du, ein Aergerniß den
Deinen, ein Schatten, und liebst sie nimmer.
Und jene, die du nennst, die Verheißenen,
Wo sind die Neuen, daß du an Freundeshand
Erwarmst, wo nahn sie, daß du einmal
Einsame Rede, vernehmlich seiest?
Klanglos ist, armer Mann, in der Halle dir,
Und gleich den Unbegrabenen, irrest du
Unstät und suchest Ruh und niemand
Weiß den beschiedenen Weg zu weisen.
Sei denn zufrieden! der Baum entwächst
Dem heimathlichen Boden, aber es sinken ihm
Die liebenden, die jugendlichen
Arme, und trauernd neigt er sein Haupt.
 (p.142) Des Lebens Überfluß, das Unendliche,
Das um ihn und dämmert, er faßt es nie.
Doch lebts in ihm und gegenwärtig,
Wärmend und wirkend, die Frucht entquillt ihm.
Du hast gelebt! ge auch dir, auch dir
Erfreut die ferne Sonne dein Haupt,
Und Stralen aus der schönen Zeit, es
Habe die Boten dein Herz gefunden.
Vernommen hast du sie verstanden die Sprache der Fremdlinge,
Gedeutet ihre Seele! Dem Sehnenden war
Genug der Wink, und Winke sind
Von Alters her die Sprache der Götter.
Und wunderbar, als hätte von Anbeginn
Des Menschen Geist, das Werden und Wirken all,
Des Lebens alte Weise schon erfahren
Kennt er im ersten Zeichen Vollendetes schon,
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Und fliegt, der kühne Geist, wie Adler den
Gewittern, weissagend seinen
Kommenden Göttern, voraus.
How limited the time of our day.
You were and saw and marveled, it’s evening already.
So sleep now, where infinitely far
The years of the nations drift overhead.
And some see past their own time,
A god has shown them the open, but longing
You stand on the shore, a scandal to your kin,
A shade, and you no longer love them,
And those you name, the new and inspired ones,
Where are they to warm you with their
Friendly hands, and where do they approach so that you,
Lonely speech, might one day be heard?
The halls, poor man, give no echo,
And like the unburied dead you wander
Unsettled and look for rest, and no one can
Show you the determined path.
So content yourself with this! the tree outgrows
Its native soil, but its loving
Youthful boughs droop down,
And it bows its crown in mourning.
 (p.143) The overflow of life, the infinite,
That around him, dawning, he never grasps it.
Yet it lives in him, and, all the while,
Warming and effective, the fruit springs forth from him.
You have lived! The distant sun ed you too
And gladdens too your head,
And rays from a better time,
The messengers have found your heart.
You perceived, you understood the language of strangers,
Interpreted their soul! The hint sufficed
The longing one, and hints have long
Been the language of the gods.
And wondrous, as if from the outset the human spirit
Had experienced all that would be born and made manifest,
The ancient way of life
In the first signs he sees their completion
And, emboldened with this insight, flying like an eagle
Ahead of the storm, he prophesies
“Doch Sehnend Stehst/Am Ufer Du” (“But Longing You Stand on the Shore”)
Page 15 of 19
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 
2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.  
Subscriber: Swarthmore College; date: 12 August 2020
The coming of his gods.40
The plot of the fragment divides into roughly three parts. Strophes 1–4 describe 
Rousseau’s alienation from and outsiderliness to his contemporaries and his 
failure to win an audience for his writing. Strophes 2–8.2 describe a kind of 
consolation available to Rousseau in having lived and produced something 
anyway. Strophes 8.2–10 offer generalizations about the stance of anyone who 
might be moved to flights of vision and composition.
Part I begins with a generalization that emphasizes the general fact of human 
finitude, without specific reference to Rousseau. Rousseau then appears as the 
second-person, past-tense addressee in line 2, where he is described as having 
been, having seen, and having been astounded by things. But that time of vision 
is past. The years pass by, as though their passing were the natural course of 
things, without occasioning any particular pain. In the second strophe, however, 
Rousseau is particularly marked as someone who stands out against his time, on 
the shores of something different, an annoyance or scandal to his kin and a 
shadow who is unable to love them. The third and fourth strophes then reinforce 
and deepen this outsiderliness, as those to whom he has called do not appear, so 
that Rousseau himself, metonymized as “lonely speech” (Einsame Rede), stands 
alone, without being heard, without echo or reception, hence unreceived, like 
the unburied, and given over to inconstancy, restlessness, and errancy, without 
any allotted path to follow. Far from treating Rousseau as a successful and 
confident prophet, the master thought in these  (p.144) first four strophes is of 
Rousseau in his reflective visionariness and hopes for more meaningful life as 
inherently outside the common and barred from any terms of reception.
The main pivot of the poem then comes in the first line of strophe 5, as the 
speaker offers Rousseau a kind of consolation or at least a command to be 
satisfied anyway, inasmuch as the tree that outgrows its ground nonetheless 
remains connected to it, casting its branches downward. So too might Rousseau, 
mourning, remain in contact with the people who fail to receive him. And so too, 
though he is unable successfully to grasp or understand it in order to master it, 
might there remain a life or power in him that produces something, as the tree 
produces its fruit unknowingly. One who accepts this consolation will then have 
lived and written anyway and so stood within a movement of life that 
nonetheless cannot be understood and mastered. Thus in writing Rousseau will 
have written for those who are yet to come, even if this writing remains less the 
purveying of a doctrine than a felt interpretation of the soul or life energy that 
they are to actualize expressively in a new life of autonomy blended with love. 
Rousseau himself then remains in the position of the one who is longing (“dem 
Sehnenden”), not the one who confidently knows and guides.
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What Rousseau has then achieved—a felt, expressive, but indeterminate 
response in words to a difficult, fragmented condition coupled with a visionary 
but indeterminate hope for a better one––is then generalized as characteristic of 
anyone who is longing for life otherwise. Such a one may be responsive to hints 
(“Winke”), as if, subjunctively (“hätte”) the ground plot and purpose of human 
life were determinately available to reflection and poetic vision, even though 
they are not or not fully. What remains as possible is then to fly over the land 
and life of the people, discerning signs and anticipating their fulfillment, but still 
only prophesying what remains yet to come.
And this very movement that is ascribed to Rousseau—a movement from 
problematic, visionary outsider, to locus of the expression of life and power that 
are not discursively grasped, to a renewed, qualified ability to live and move 
anyway—this movement is itself completed in the poem, as Hölderlin / the 
speaker moves from awed captivation with Rousseau’s visionary strangeness 
and untimeliness to a larger sense that strangeness and uncanniness as such 
may be both aspects of and expressible within a wider movement of life itself. 
Reflection and speech are, therefore, possible for a finite, human subject within 
life, even when the terms of that life are not open to full, discursive, 
philosophical understanding. Sustaining and developing this thought through 
the course of the poem composed in relation to Rousseau as an object of both 
absorption and reflection amounts, then, to a kind of temporalized self- 
knowledge, or a kind of Romantic philosophy in the absence of systematic 
philosophy, that takes both human powers of reflection and human finitude 
seriously.
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